Chapter 4 - Planning
When discussing my research methods in the first chapter, I noted two key, but interconnected areas of research: systems concepts and planning. The preceding two chapters focused on the first area with the intent of discussing concepts relevant to understanding the complexities of natural-social system interactions. The objective was to use the concepts to critique the second research area - planning. This latter area is also split into two chapters. The current chapter - Chapter 4 - deals with planning on a more general level, considering definitions, categories of theory, and broad application of the systems concepts. Chapter 5 focuses more specifically on the systems of concern to planning and the planning systems themselves.
The key question of these chapters is: What are the implications of the systems concepts and complex human characteristics - discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively - for the nature and process of planning? The question is considered in regards to our ability to act, or, more particularly, to plan to act, sustainably.
The emphasis in both of these chapters is on planning approaches that arise from the engineering paradigm. This style of thinking has had some degree of influence on many types of planning, but particularly on what Friedmann (e.g. 1987, 1996) refers to as "societal guidance." Although I believe it would be interesting to apply these systems concepts to the "social mobilization" tradition (ibid., 1996) which incorporates the more radical forms of planning, I restrict myself to the former. My interest primarily lies in questioning the role of planning instituted by bureaucratic governance structures. Given the system characteristics described - particularly regarding the complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability inherent in sympoietic systems, I believe our current planning approaches have a limited ability to cope.
In the following chapter - Chapter 5 - I discuss the ability of our planning systems to cope with the complex and uncertain characteristics of sympoietic systems when they are a subject of planning. In addition, I consider planning systems themselves as poietic systems.
Definitions of planning found in the literature range from broad to narrow, emphasizing various aspects of the above description (Figure 4.1). The narrower end is typically related to the role of professional practitioners such as the pragmatic definition of "planning is what planners do" (Vickers in Alexander 1992, p 71). On a wider scale, Wachs (1995, p xiii) notes that, "we have gradually come to see planning as a much broader set of human activities, encompassing the physical world and also the realm of public and social services. While retaining technical analytical and design components, planning has come to be seen also as intensely political and value laden."
To integrate the discussion in the literature (in particular, Friedmann 1987, Alexander 1992, Various 1995, Mandlebaum et al. 1996), I suggest the following comprehensive description of planning to indicate the range of interpretations possible:
The term planning can be applied to an activity, a process, a profession, and/or a discipline. As an activity, its primary concern is to visualize future possibilities and intentionally choose, guide, and/or create current behaviours, structures, and/or tools to achieve and/or target toward desirable future states. As a process, it refers to the methods, mechanisms and tools for accomplishing the activity, especially in a group or social context. As a profession, it refers to the group of individuals carrying appropriate skill sets who fulfill an agreed upon social responsibility to guide the processes. As a discipline, it refers to the body of knowledge, related to all aspects of planning, held symbolically or in the minds of practitioners, researches, and theorists.
Such a description, however, is quite cumbersome! As indicated in Figure 4.1, I will use planning in a somewhat general sense. I do not restrict it to the purview of planners, recognizing that many others 'plan.' I will, however, interpret it as a social activity, often carried out by institutions with varying degrees of concern for, and definitions of, the social interest. This position on the continuum fits with my favorite definition, the elegant and evocative phrase: "planning acts as an intervening variable between knowledge and action" (Westley 1995, p 396). The line builds on Friedmann's (e.g. 1987) concept of linking knowledge and action. Implicit in this conception is an essential notion which Forester (1989, p 3) notes: "planning is the guidance of future action" (my emphasis). Interpreting planning as an 'intervening variable' suggests that it may be amenable to many situations and contexts, depending on their specific characteristics. Coupled with the notion of 'linking,' it lends itself toward recognizing the importance of different types of knowledge as well as the recursive process. The definition recognizes that "planning is not everything" (Alexander 1992, p 73), but is sufficiently general to be relevant at different holarchical levels. It also recognizes the process and future orientations, while establishing the need for expertise (i.e. knowledge), and possible intervention (i.e. action), without tying the process to the profession. I shall use the idea of planning as the link between knowledge and action as an integrating concept.
More comprehensively, and incorporating some extensions from Morley (1986), planning acts as a link between:
Considering these very basic linkages, some important parallels with the systems concepts can be noted. I describe them briefly in order to draw attention to them. They will arise as key points throughout the remainder of this and the following chapter.
In many ways, the term 'theory' is as problematic as 'planning.' Definitions vary from the precise to the broad, often depending on the context and discipline. There are generally two definitions reflective of 'hard' and 'softer' science. According to the former, a theory is "a coherent system of rules and principles, a more or less verified or established explanation accounting for known facts or phenomena" (Gell Mann 1995, p 90). It is generally taken to have predictive ability, and, in the Popperian sense, to be falsifiable. McClendon (1995, p145) notes that "Theories are not facts... Theories are what make it possible to transfer a large number of factual observations into a logical system of ideas that explains the real world in a coherent and understandable fashion." By this definition, theories are descriptive explanations which have prescriptive abilities. McClendon's is one of the softer definitions for the term typically applied within the social sciences. Another states that theory "refer[s] to speculation, a guess or conjecture, or an untested hypothesis, idea or opinion" (Gell Mann 1995, p91).
Considering this variation among definitions of theory, it is interesting to note that of many authors who claim to discuss "planning theory," few actually state what these 'theories' are. For example Jacobs (1995, p 93-4), Hendler (1995, p 3) and Wolfe (1989, p 68) all profess to discuss theory, but subsequently refer only to "approaches" and "models." Similar confusion, found in other discussions, is generated by the range of meaning in the definition of theory and by the fact that planning is a paradoxical discipline. The 'hard' definition of theory makes questionable whether planning theories even exist, a question implicit in the confused literature. I adopt the 'softer' approach, defining theory as a generally accepted system of ideas which explain real world situations and provide the potential for prediction, although in a speculative rather than precise sense. Theories are descriptive explanations which have some degree of explanatory, organizing, or predictive potential. They consequently also have prescriptive potential. It is critical, however, to recognize a distinction between predictive and prescriptive. Theories establish what does, and ostensibly will, happen (on a hypothetical level) for subjects from physics and ecology, to planning and other disciplines. As noted, however, planning also relates to what should happen - normative considerations are essential.
Hume is generally attributed with drawing attention to the is/ought distinction: what is does not necessarily lead to what should be (e.g. see Wenz 1988). Although what is may place restrictions on what can be, our human capacity to reflect on possibilities and make choices means that what is and what should be are connected by values. This connection exists whether it is recognized or not. Where application of values are not made explicit, they are implicit in underlying cultural conditioning.
The fundamental need for a position and a meaning for our lives and for our species dominates whatever system of thought we espouse. We cannot exist conceptually without such cosmologies, yet many people are unaware of the values upon which they have founded their structure of meaning. (Palmer 1988, p 14)
Recognizing this evaluative connection is crucial for planning. Due to its future orientation, planning influences what will/can be. In a just society, it must consequently raise the question of what should be by acknowledging the role of values. The parallel can be illustrated using Friedmann's conception (Figure 4.2). What is corresponds to knowledge that is held - what ought to be corresponds to actions prior to their taking place. In consequence, planning relates to the linkage: value. It therefore has a normative aspect. This normative consideration must be integrated into planning on both theoretical and practical levels. In addition, recognizing planning as an "intervening variable" suggests a need to recognize the importance of multiple values. In consequence it is necessary to consider how these values can be determined and how they can be acted upon.
In a sense, then, planning is paradoxical: it is concerned with understanding the activity and process itself, and is therefore descriptive. Yet simultaneously, it is concerned, in a pro-active way, with the formation of future states, and is therefore prescriptive.
As an intellectual and professional community, planners recognize that every act of planning pursues certain human values and that planning is in many fundamental ways a series of statements about what we take to be right or wrong and what we take to represent the highest priorities of the society in which the planning is undertaken. (Wachs 1995, p xiv)
To make the distinction between descriptive/explanatory and prescriptive/normative clear I will refer to the former as 'theory' and the latter as 'models.' Such use is consistent with much of the discussion in the literature as noted above regarding Jacobs, Hendler and Wolfe.
Adopting a softer view of theory, I follow the tradition established in the literature and note different categories of planning theory. Hendler (1995) follows Faludi (1973) and speaks of theory in, of and for planning. She also notes that each of these can be separated into descriptive/explanatory and prescriptive/normative categories. Wolfe (1989) uses only three categories: substantive, explanations, and process, incorporating some prescriptive considerations into the latter. Alexander (1992) uses four categories: definitional, substantive, process and normative. Galloway and Mahayni (1977) discuss only the substantive/procedural split, however, as Hendler does, they also note the descriptive and prescriptive functions of theories.
Scott and Roweis (1977) defend application of a harder definition of theory by emphasizing their attempt to determine what planning is rather than to succumb to "speculative normative planning" (ibid., p 1098). They declare the normative view to be one-sided since it abstracts from the historical fact of planning: "So long as [a theory] resists empirical refutation it provides us with elaborately structured expectations about the world. And if eventually it should indeed be shown to be false, then we have at least gained the certain knowledge that this theory need never again be taken seriously into consideration" (ibid., p 1098). Such decisiveness is only possible for descriptive theory, and ignores recognition of the continually changing context. The authors claim that "a viable theory of urban planning should not only tell us what planning is, but also what we can, and must, do as progressive planners" (ibid., p 1099). They make a prescriptive claim on descriptive evidence, ignoring the is-value-ought linkage. They do highlight a key point, however. Ideally what is can provide some indication of what can be and consequently inform the process of deciding what should be. "How can we improve planning practice without understanding planning? Understanding requires theories explaining how planning works and how it functions in society" (Sager 1995, p 170).
By synthesizing the above categorizations with Friedmann's definition of planning, Figure 4.3 provides a simple diagram that illustrates the relations among the different types of planning theory. I find Hendler's (1995) division of theoretical types to be most instructive and, therefore, follow her distinction, providing labels from others since she uses none. Due to the inconsistencies noted in this "rather jumbled field" (Wolfe 1989, p 68) of planning theory, I emphasize that these definitions are not universal in the planning literature. These categorizations are also relevant for prescriptive models.
The various categories of theory are intricately connected and are not mutually exclusive. This is in part due to holarchical issues that are relevant here. As I apply them, it is important not to interpret the categories as scalar concepts. For example, definitional theory refers to the political question regarding the governance of nations, but also the role of planning at a community level. Procedural theory can refer to the degree of stakeholder participation in a community context or at a global level. Definitional theory refers to what planning is and procedural theory to how it happens regardless of the scale being considered. For example, at a community level definitional theory questions what role planning does/can/should play in understanding, visioning, and developing the community; procedural theory is concerned with how planning can realize those concerns through various procedures and regulations. Definitional aspects of planning at a community level may relate to procedural aspects at a social level. I articulate these distinctions to emphasize that both are significant and that planners should be cognizant of both.
The systems concepts presented in this thesis are relevant to planning in four ways: regarding the three categories of theory described and also regarding the relations among these categories of theory, especially as they pertain to the learning process.
In each of these four cases the linkage between the descriptive/prescriptive aspects is important. There are questions of what role planning should play in the wider social context (definitional issues), what planning procedures should be used (procedural issues), what knowledge and/or type of knowledge should inform the process (subject-oriented issues) and how the link between theory and learning should be emphasized.
In each case the autopoietic-sympoietic distinction can be used to explore the descriptive aspect by illustrating the types of knowledge and systems that are being used or generated. The distinction can also be used to help make prescriptions, although it is essential to recognize that the latter are normative considerations. They must consequently include the expression of particular values. The critique and subsequent suggestions I make in the following discussion will therefore reflect my particular orientation, which is based on the values expressed in Chapter 1, and revisited below, regarding sustainability. In addition, I believe that sympoiesis provides a more accurate description of complex natural and social systems and should be used for conceptualization.
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, my intent is to cover a broad range of considerations and implications rather than provide detail on any particular aspect. To achieve this objective, I consider each of the four areas noted, although not equally. I concentrate on subject oriented considerations and procedural theory. In the current chapter I cover definitional issues, using a variety of examples, including National Parks which is covered in slightly more detail. In addition, I briefly consider learning aspects in the next section.
Systems thinking in general, has had a key influence on planning. Friedmann (1987 p 74-5, see also 1996), in a table listing key influences on American planning, has a column labeled 'systems analysis' arising in the late 1950s from the 'systems engineering' intellectual tradition. In the same table, however, he links 'engineering sciences' to various authors across the whole scope of planning beginning with Saint Simon and August Comte in the early 1800s. There is a pervasive, 'systems thinking' influence throughout the history of planning that is based on the engineering control paradigm. More recently, addition of systems analysis to the rational model, has created the sense of a more exact, scientific approach (Wolfe 1989). This particular approach has been integral to planning, especially within institutional frameworks, though to a substantially lesser degree in radical forms of planning.
When considering this influence of systems thinking on planning, however, it is critical to recognize fundamental differences between the 'engineering' paradigm and newer approaches based on complex systems concepts such as those discussed in Chapter 2 (Table 4.1). Application of 'new' systems thinking (e.g. self-organization, complexity) to planning seems to be quite limited as yet in the formal literature. Only a few papers have appeared in key planning journals.
Christensen (1985) who speaks primarily of prescriptive procedural planning, uses some ideas from chaos theory. Some work has arisen from simulation, such as Allen's (e.g. 1982,1994) work on urban systems. Hwang (1996) introduces some of the concepts from the non-linear paradigm on a theoretical level. There have also been a number of systems thinkers concerned with planning issues, Simon (e.g. 1996) is a key example, although his work is based more on the engineering tradition. Others publishing in systems journals include Beer (1991) and other cyberneticists. Within the area of natural resource planning and management, a few authors use complex systems thinking to suggest approaches for coping with complex systems (e.g. Slocombe 1993, 1995, Jope and Dunstan 1996).
Despite this lack of application of new systems thinking, the trend toward alternative planning approaches suggests a growing recognition of planning's sympoietic nature, regarding both the subjects, and processes, involved. Many of the newer approaches are employing sympoietic characteristics. The flexible, adaptable, communicative, transactive, collaborative characteristics espoused by a host of planners (e.g. Susskind and McCreary 1985, Forester 1989, Moore Milroy 1991, Friedmann 1993, Throgmorton 1995, Nelson and Serafin 1996, Mandlebaum et al. 1996, Nelson and Skibicki 1997) and non-planners (e.g. Senge 1990, Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, Hennessey 1994, Diemer and Alvarez 1995, and Hempel 1996) reflect the characteristics of sympoietic systems. I will describe some examples in the next chapter.
It is important to recognize the role of learning: the process that closes the self-production cycle. Figure 4.4 illustrates the cycle using the notion of planning as a link between knowledge and action. Evaluation and learning are both critical aspects of the poietic planning process that may be given varying degrees of recognition, as illustrated by the shading. Planners can either acknowledge and incorporate both or can presume them to be irrelevant. In the latter case, both of these factors will be included implicitly because - whether or not these connections are recognized - they form part of the recurring, poietic process. The above categories can be used to emphasize different aspects of the learning.
In addition, due to a focus on process, definitional issues are often taken for granted. As Beauregard (1995, p 164) states:
My ideal practitioner would consider the epistemological underpinnings of action, the broad sweep of history, the tensions within a capitalist democracy, the elusive qualities of space, and unresolvable societal conflicts. I expect, however, that most practitioners would be satisfied with making one aspect of the community work better.
I believe learning on this definitional level is important - partly because it is implicit and unrecognized. It occurs on an underlying cultural level through adherence to cultural norms, value biases, and institutional programs and influences that are so pervasive as to be unnoticed. In effect, learning on this level is a powerful positive feedback that reinforces global influences acting as self-organizing factors in the generation of the social systems. There are similarities here with the role of paradigms in the development of science as described in Section 3.3.
Planning is a highly politicized practice... Is it any wonder, then, that planners feel schizophrenic. They learn in school - and come to say - that planning is technical and disciplined by objective methods; but they learn in practice - and come to fear - that it is political and subject to outrageous manipulations. (Throgmorton 1993, p 335)
Figure 4.5 is an attempt to capture the salient points regarding the development of the gap between academic and practicing planners. The discipline arose from the practice and a need to educate new practitioners, as well as to gain a better understanding of the practice itself.
Self-organizing factors can be recognized in the genesis of the discipline. They include the need for learning, the role of planning in society, thinking versus doing personalities, development of new ideas, and their subsequent reporting and application. Two different attractors, developing from different factors specific to planner characteristics, are illustrated in Figure 4.5a.
The 'academic' attractor is weighted toward journal publications rather than planning reports, toward theoretical rather than pragmatic ideas, and toward thinking rather than doing personalities. Through feedback, such characteristics are reinforced: people who excel at academics become academics, theory is based on theory, and ideas are shared among other academics. Through the subsequent self-producing process, the academic discipline gradually defines itself. The process has the potential to become, and some would argue has become, autopoietic - Throgmorton's quote opening this section is an example.
Alongside these changes it is necessary to consider the relevant environment/context and the presence of structural coupling. Initially, the academic and professional environment/context was more or less the same thing. However, as the discipline grew, academics became structurally coupled to a different environment, relations increasing through contact with other disciplines, and decreasing with practitioners. Through successful structural coupling and continued self-production, the academic discipline has been able to become increasingly organizationally closed, and consequently more autopoietic. Similar though contrasting developments have occurred on the practitioners' side.
There are advantages to autopoietic systems that are related to learning potential, in particular the ability to build up complex information. However, it is essential to maintain structures suited to the environment/context with the consequence that the information will be more relevant in these situations. The problem here is that academics are coupled to the academic environment and practitioners are coupled to the 'real world.' Calls for a better exchange of information and ideas and for development of a loose confederacy of practitioners (e.g. Brooks 1993 Mandlebaum 1993, Baum 1997), are appeals for creation of a more sympoietic system integrating the two types of planners.
As a specific example, Richmond (1995) describes the application of computer technology in transportation planning, illustrating the poietic process and the development of autopoietic characteristics in planners.
The fascination with computers is becoming ever greater, as is the tendency to formulate planning problems around what a personal computer can do rather than based on the essence of the problems themselves... Employers are partly to blame, for it has become a standard part of interviewing nascent planning professionals to ask if they know computer software... Students, knowing that these "skills" will be demanded of them, thus ask for courses making use of them. Planning problems, in turn, are modeled to give the appearance of being soluble by such devices. The need for "computer literacy" is being stressed while too many students are illiterate in their own language and unable to use it effectively to structure thought. (Richmond 1995, p306)
These examples illustrate a critical point. The problematic reliance on computer models emerges from the interactions between a direction (the need for "computer literacy") and constraints (e.g. education possibilities, problems reduced to fit models, poor understanding of complex algorithms). These are magnified by positive feedbacks (demand for skill, request for courses, modeled 'solutions'). Though assumed to be centered in the computer literate professionals, information is actually distributed among the initial investigators, the study constituents, the computer programmers, the professional planner applying the model, and the constituents in the modeled situation. By presuming autopoiesis, critical elements are missing. Our cognitive ability for symbolic representation allows such misinterpretation. We can generate a belief in autopoiesis even when sympoiesis provides a more accurate interpretation.
The key point regarding the sustainability of human systems is that, as individuals, we are biophysical autopoietic systems dependent on biophysical sympoietic systems for our ability to persist. We operate within the paradox of interdependence, requiring a predictable environment which, to retain its adaptive ability, must continually change. Since our species has survived for millennia, developing highly complex socio-cultural systems, our adaptive responses have obviously been adequate. To argue that we have sufficiently demonstrated we can act sustainably, however, ignores the critical recognition that sustainability can only be determined in hindsight (Costanza and Folke 1996).
We can never know if current activities are sustainable, but can only infer their potential. As indicated by the discussion of sustainability in Section 1.3, there are currently significant concerns regarding this potential. These are complicated by recognition of the complex, unpredictable systems characteristics described in Chapters 2 and 3. As indicated by the discussion of human complexity in Section 3.2, our mental and social capacities provide both advantages and disadvantages regarding our ability to understand and manifest the potential for achieving sustainability.
Arising from the human characteristics identified, there are two particular issues that I believe are of critical importance regarding sustainability. First, sympoietic and autopoietic systems can be mistakenly interpreted for each other (Figure 4.6). Second, it is possible to interpret autopoietic systems as being totally autonomous without recognizing the importance of structural coupling. These misunderstandings occur in relation to both the interpretation and design of systems. I believe the western scientific paradigm - which has contributed to both - has primarily reflected application of the autopoietic lens. The consequent inaccurate understanding of systems, ecological systems in particular, are prevalent. The use of the ball in the bowl to represent ecosystem equilibrium described above (See Box 2.5) is an example. Such misinterpretation of ecosystems has led to inadequate management of natural resources in many cases, from forest resources to parks and protected areas. For example, the latter have been isolated as natural islands in significantly altered landscapes, losing potentially critical connections. In forest management, misinterpretation has resulted in creation of monoculture plantations and a presumption that even very large clearcuts will regenerate to the previous level of vigour.
A key example of the second concern - presumed independence - is the neoclassical economic interpretation of the economic cycle which is so often drawn as a totally separate self-producing cycle (e.g. James 1991). It typically fails to recognize our dependence on environmental inputs. Recognizing the human abilities for interpretation, forethought, and self-awareness, the neo-classical economic system which relies on scarcity as a signal to generate responses seems rather crude. This is particularly important when it is noted that societies that perceive their resources as infinite are not likely to reduce their impacts (Gadgil and Berkes 1991). This is especially problematic when it is recognized that a society can misinterpret the state of their resources.
In addition it is essential to recognize that our impacts on biophysical systems have achieved a fundamental change in scale both spatially and temporally. Humans are influencing biophysical systems on a global scale and have set a future trajectory of impacts for a questionable time into the future as illustrated by concerns regarding destruction of the ozone layer and climate change issues. Our conventional institutional arrangements are not necessarily able to cope with the changing circumstances (Doubleday 1993). Hardin (1968) outlined a critical aspect of the problem by describing the 'tragedy of the commons.' Although used often to emphasize the danger of our current approach, his metaphor has also been criticized because it lacks recognition of social process that are in place (Feeny et al. 1996, Hanna and Jentoft 1996). Especially at a community level, allocative and distributive processes dealing with common resources have been prevalent (Gadgil and Berkes 1991, Young 1996). However, the change in scale of our impacts makes Hardin's argument relevant: "Hardin's argument, like Malthus's argument about population, may turn out to be incomplete and premature but ultimately correct" (Hempel 1996, p 85). While community based decision making and resource sharing processes have prevented over-'grazing' of many different types of local commons, the global commons has never before been an issue. We are only now developing the resource distribution procedures for 'managing' the global commons - currently using the industrial capitalist paradigm - an approach that uses the rather crude neo-classical signal.
The four attributes of sustainability identified in Section 1.3 are important to consider. Persistence of our species depends on persistence of other species: ecological interconnections are essential. While I believe it is critical to consider aspects of social sustainability, I also believe that ecological sustainability is a prerequisite to social sustainability in the long term. In order to focus this discussion, I therefore primarily consider the natural-social system interface, particularly where our impact is quite explicit, using parks and protected areas as examples. My arguments in Sections 4.5, 5.1 and 5.2 will make obvious the notion that ecological and social issues cannot be separated.
This draws attention to the third attribute - the value based implications of sustainability. Such values will be articulated through social choices - choices which, as the discussion on poietic social systems indicates - are not straightforward. The paradox of interdependence - valid on both biophysical and psycho-social levels means that while social values influence individual values, the reverse is also the case. The balance between individual interests and the common interest - a critical issue for sustainability - remains a dynamic and contentious issue. The policy implications of sustainability based on human values arise from these concerns and lead to the question that underlies the discussion in this thesis: given natural and social systems complexities and their interconnections, what can - and should - we do to address these issues?
As psycho-social entities we have two advantages: mental capacity and social interaction. The possibilities presented by the first - cognition, interpretation, learning, and self-awareness - do not reduce uncertainty, and do not come without accompanying disadvantages. However, they do provide some potentially powerful tools for developing responsive, reflexive social systems holding some ability to cope with the complexities we face. In addition, social interaction provides the opportunity for making sympoietic changes - responses that are adaptive and evolutionary, that rely on shared information and control, and that allow innovation since they are not restricted by organizational closure.
When coupled with the systems concepts, these points regarding sustainability and our human capacities for planning, lead to two lines of questioning which were noted in the outline of research (Section 1.2.2 and Figure 1.1). The first set of questions relates to our current abilities and approaches. Can we cope with the complexities and uncertainties inherent in these systems? In particular, can we cope with the sympoietic systems that form the environment upon which we depend? Do we recognize the differences between the two systems types and treat them appropriately? Do we recognize the implications of structural coupling and organizational closure? Do we have planning approaches that carry sympoietic characteristics? Do we recognize the implications of future causality? Does planning play an adequate role as an integral part of our complex, adaptive, sympoietic social system?
My general answer to these questions is - not adequately. The answer leads me to the second line of questioning. How can and should we cope with these system complexities? What planning approaches should be encouraged or developed to ensure appropriate treatment of autopoietic and sympoietic systems? What role should planning play in our social systems? Can planning help to make these systems adaptable? Should we generate sympoietic planning approaches, and if so, how? Answers to this second line of questioning are not simple. However, they will be the focus of discussion in the next chapter.
In general, I believe planning has potential to act as a key contributor to human adaptability. To play this role, however, planning must be able to understand and cope with complex natural and social systems and their interaction. Planning for sustainability must be capable of coping with the interaction between "causes" of human behaviours and their actualization, structural coupling of individuals to their social context, and structural coupling of social systems to the environments they are embedded within. It must be structured to allow coping with the uncertainties and complexities inherent in both natural and social sympoietic systems. It is imperative to recognize the recursivity and self-organization of poietic systems and to acknowledge the disadvantages, but to capitalize on the advantages.
Towards the end of Chapter 2, the systems chapter, I noted difficulties that arise from the human potential for future causality - especially with respect to planning systems. To consider this in more depth, I expand on the quote from Campbell:
A future self-referent system that also has mechanical ability to operate on the physical world around it is capable of extraordinary causal behaviour. It can modify the structure of itself and its surroundings under the direction of its internal future description so as to assume the form that it internally describes. This allows a representation of the future to direct activity in the present. In effect, future self-reference gives the future access to act causally on the present.
It is of utmost importance to recognize that these directive future self-referent models have a more imperative status than predictions of the future. They are also commands that cause the physical systems under their influence to materialize them in the future. They have the added certainty of, say, the statements of the corrupt bookie that not only predict which horse will win, but also serve as directions to the jockeys to cause them to fix the race, thus ensuring the outcome. Insofar as the future self-referent system can discriminately entertain directive models of the future that are within its capacity to fulfill, those models will eventuate. They will eventuate because and only because they are future self-referentially modeled.
Future causality is the relationship of such attainable preconceived future organizational states to the events that bring them into being through preconception... [It] implies that the future acts causally on the present through the proxy of a descriptive prerepresentation. This capacity of future self-referent organization represents a major new emergent causal quality. It allows effects to temporally precede their causes. (Campbell 1985, p 161-2)
Campbell's point is of critical importance. It illustrates the paradoxical quality inherent in human systems, emphasizing recursivity and visioning possibilities. This is especially relevant for planning systems, since they are 'future self-referent systems' that can 'discriminately entertain directive models of the future.' The question, however, lies in their 'capacity to fulfill' - an issue that I consider in this and the following chapter. In addition, I believe that attributing causes only to the future would be in error, history also plays an absolutely critical role.
What we do today largely depends on how we interpret the past, and our interpretation of the past will, to a considerable extent, be shaped by the futures that our desires have already created. (Schwartz and Thompson 1990 in Hempel 1996, p 226)
We are because of what we were, and because of what we thought we might become. What we are influences what we think we were, and what we think we might become. These complexities and paradoxes cannot be ignored in discussion or application of planning. In consequence, it is inadequate to consider planning from a control oriented, social learning, or even radical approach, without recognizing the human potential for future causality, and the recursive, self-organizing nature of poietic systems.
This meta-crisis has rapidly thrust the world into a disequilibrium system condition, and into a pervasive system breakdown that is rapidly moving the world towards new and significantly different system structures. If planning and design are to generate sustainable decisions, these professions must achieve systemic insight of their societal role in management of the physical, ecological, economic and cultural systems that sustain us. (Motloch and Woodfin 1993, p 7)
I begin with the aspect of planning that I will discuss on a general level - the role of planning in complex social systems. I will leave a more in-depth consideration of this involved and complex issue to the future. There are, however, some points to make that set the context for the remainder of the discussion and illustrate potential application of the systems concepts at a broad level. I focus on the planning tradition Friedmann (1987, 1996) refers to as "societal guidance," in particular to "social reform."
As a system property, planning is an activity that capitalizes on the ability for visioning the future to increase the possibility of sustainability by manipulating the present. Our complex human capacities enable us to plan on a level unattained by other species. In effect, it allows us, as biophysical autopoietic systems, to capitalize on sympoietic advantages through application of our mental capacities, especially through social interaction. On an individual autopoietic level, we are limited by structural coupling, reproduction, and other characteristics. The ability to think, feel, conceive the future, and learn alters these limitations, offering some potential to reduce them.
In a sense, planning also allows sympoietic social systems to capitalize on autopoietic advantages, by developing a degree of organizational closure within subsystems. This enables components of the broader system to concentrate their mental abilities on particular foci and gain advantage by enhancing the information content of the whole system as indicated by the process of normal science described in Chapter 3.
It is essential to recognize Friedmann's (e.g. 1987) notion of linking knowledge and action within a future oriented context. Planning is the link to purposeful or goal-directed action, toward manifestation of some desired future state. Individual retirement planning provides a simple example. The purpose is to ensure adequate inputs for maintaining sustainability (both biophysical and psycho-social) for individual human systems by considering possible future needs and manipulating present conditions accordingly. In social systems it becomes much more complicated because the systems themselves, as well as their components, are complex. This makes the future needs, manipulation of present conditions and possible choices all problematic. In addition, planning is inherently self-referential since it so often part of the system it is planning for.
At its most basic, planning arises from our need to ensure a continued, predictable supply of biophysical inputs. As argued in the previous chapter, however, to consider only this aspect of sustainability for human systems is inadequate. Psycho-social needs are also critical. As with the evolution of social groups and knowledge systems illustrated in the previous chapter (Figure 3.4), planning arises from an interaction between global-local influences. Particularly important mental abilities include forethought and creativity. Important physical abilities include the potential for manipulating the environment and enhancement of these abilities through improved technology. The recursive nature of these influences, the learning cycles discussed above, and also those of the social system itself, are important.
Notwithstanding its importance, the planner's role in history is not a determining one. Thought follows practice, and planners have to take their cues from practice, responding to actors' need for information, interpretation, problem definition, projection, evaluation, and strategic programming. Because of this "organic" relationship to the requirements of political practice, planning must also deal with purposes, motivations, contingencies, and risks. (Friedmann 1987, p 11)
While Friedmann recognizes some degree of recursion, emphasizing the "organic" relationship between the factors noted, I disagree with the first statement in this quote. Although he notes key factors, he does not account for self-organizing processes, especially global influences, the potential for future causality, or the importance of recursion. Thought follows practice, but practice follows thought. I believe planning, on both individual and collective levels, plays a fundamental role in determining our future. How, or whether, we can effectively influence the relevant circumstances according to our chosen values remains a critical, yet unanswerable, question. Further, I believe our future causal potential must be recognized on both explicit and implicit levels. In general, the process of planning occurs on an explicit level. We intentionally vision possible futures, choosing directions because of where we believe they will lead - regardless of whether or not we manage to realize the visions. There are other choices made with a view to the future, however, that manifest as outcomes on a much subtler level. Campbell (1985, quoted above) spoke of corrupt bookies intentionally rigging races and therefore manifesting outcomes based on their own prerepresentations. I believe other surprising outcomes - still from intentional action and based on prerepresentations - arise. Some are unexpected outcomes that are side-effects of intentional influences, or from unintentional influences. Other outcomes arise from influences that are presumed to have no effect. These influences can be both powerful and dangerous because they operate on an implicit level. Their very nature makes them undetectable - always. Land classification systems provide a key example. Decisions made many years ago regarding the most useful criteria for categorization now influence land settlement and other land use patterns. I point out these explicit and implicit levels primarily to draw attention to the latter future causal influence planners, and other technicians, have. As Baum (1997, p 180) states, "planners exercise influence in intangible ways, invisible to the untrained eye." Forester's (1989) discussion recognizing planners as information processors who have varying influences on the process also point to the importance of these implicit issues. To emphasize the point, I note a comment from Giddens:
Power may be at its most alarming, and quite often its most horrifying, when applied as a sanction of force. But it is typically at its most intense and durable when running silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices. (Giddens, quoted in Bolan 1996, p505)
Given the shift toward recognizing the social construction of reality (e.g. Moore Milroy 1991), including nature (e.g. Bird 1987), the role of planners gains substantial significance. Planners become more than just informers or facilitators of a social process, they become significant contributors to the construction of social reality. Given the self-organizing factors discussed above, especially the potential for small changes to create big changes through feedback and recursion, I believe these contributions are more prevalent, though possibly quite subtle, than are typically given credit. The dominance of the automobile and its influence on the landscape is a prime example (see Richmond 1995).
The most obvious situation in which to consider the role planning plays for the systems of which it is a part is to consider the difference between centrally planned economies, free market societies, and the various combinations in between these two extremes. To apply the poietic systems distinctions, the former reflects an autopoietic approach, the latter a more sympoietic, or perhaps, self-organizing one. Adam Smith's notion of an 'invisible hand' guiding the economic process is a classic description of self-organization. Self-interest as a global influence interacting with a variety of local influences (e.g. individual abilities and circumstances) creates a particular pattern of economic exchange: a capitalist social system. The competitiveness that is generated acts as feedback, enhancing the global influence: self-interest. If the self-organizing factors do not include ethical or environmental concerns as counteracting influences, the emergent system will not necessarily be capable of ensuring social or environmental sustainability - at least not in an equitable manner. This points to the difficulties noted above regarding the crudeness of scarcity as an indicator in these systems. Further detail on these considerations would be an interesting pursuit, but will not be followed here.
In a similar vein, but considered within the context of a capitalist society, Friedmann's (1987) distinction between societal guidance and social mobilization also correlate to autopoietic and sympoietic characteristics. Societal guidance originated from the engineering intellectual tradition. The idea that scientifically based knowledge can solve any problem was transferred onto the problems of society. This led to a control-oriented, expert driven-approach based on the ability to predict social systems - an autopoietic approach presuming autopoietic social systems. In particular, the longest standing aspect, social reform, has formed the basis of many institutional arrangements and has been the "central tradition in planning theory" (Friedmann 1987, p 87).
Friedmann (ibid. p 10) draws attention to one of the difficulties of societal guidance: "Because it is invariably integrated into the state apparatus, planning for societal guidance is incapable of coping with the crisis of industrial capitalism." This point parallels the concern stated above regarding the inability of observers within the system to recognize, and cope with, the emergent properties of a system they exist within. It is difficult, if not impossible to achieve the 'next level up' to observe the consequences. This is especially a hazard for autopoietic systems since they depend on a more consistent structural exchange with their environment/context, and also because they are closed to organizational change and are, therefore, less adaptable. These issues raise difficulties due to the inflexibility and lack of adaptability of autopoietic systems. When considering the current changes, especially increasing impacts noticed on a global scale, the sustainability of such systems becomes questionable. It is also difficult to change entrenched institutional structures (Bolan 1996) due to structural coupling.
As a contrast to the societal guidance tradition, social mobilization reflects more sympoietic characteristics, such as bottom up, distributed control. It "encompasses the three great oppositional movements of utopianism, anarchism, and historical materialism, [and] developed as the great counter-movement to social reform" (Friedmann 1987, p 225). Recognizing these three movements, a range of autopoietic to sympoietic approaches can be discerned in association with each tradition. Utopian approaches tended to encourage development of individual communities of an autopoietic nature, while social anarchists could be interpreted as encouraging sympoietic type systems (see Chart 4, ibid. p 251-255). Similar distinctions could be made within the societal guidance tradition. Friedmann discusses social reform, policy analysis and social learning. Although both of the first two reflect autopoietic characteristics, the latter is sympoietic in nature (see especially ibid. p 186-7).
As is common in understanding natural systems, society can be perceived as a set of nesting and overlapping holarchies (e.g. Allen et al. 1993, Gunther and Folke 1993). These descriptions suggest that planning plays a role at each of the various levels. As a system property contributing to sustainability, then, planning needs to be considered at each level, not just at the broad political scale suggested by the distinction between centrally planned and free market societies. The role of planning at a community level could also be interpreted from the autopoietic and sympoietic perspectives. For example, the call for increased public involvement in decision-making is a call for making social systems more sympoietic through application of sympoietic approaches.
My focus in the following section and the following chapter will primarily be on institutional considerations, reflecting on aspects of societal guidance. I will consider some of the constraints and the potentials for changing institutional structures, which I believe do need to change. My focus in this context will primarily be on parks and protected areas. In the next section I consider the roles of both formally and informally expressed institutions (i.e. bureaucracies and social norms).
One of the key attributes of sustainability listed in Chapter 1 was ecological interconnections. The importance of this issue was further emphasized by noting that we are biophysical autopoietic systems structurally coupled to a particular biophysical sympoietic environment. Given the importance, then, of ecological processes for ensuring the sustainability of humans (on both biophysical as well as psycho-social levels) parks and protected areas have assumed a new and different importance.
In discussing concepts such as natural heritage, we must never forget that we are talking about our planetary survival system, not just some artifact that we, the human species, now suddenly consider important. (McNamee 1996, p 35)
The role of parks gains significance because much of our natural heritage - "our planetary survival system" - has been significantly altered. Planning for parks and protected areas becomes an aspect of planning for sustainability which may have critical importance. "It is now quite apparent that parks and protected areas offer a very wide range of services that are essential to the well-being of us all" (Nelson 1993a, p 47). These areas typically represent remnants of relatively undisturbed - or at least less disturbed - ecological processes. As such they offer the potential to provide sources for reintroduction of species and processes into other areas for learning about 'natural' processes, and a variety of other functions (Theberge 1993, and see Nelson 1987, 1993a). Hales (1989) adds another critical argument:
It has been said that if we do not preserve wild nature, our children will never forgive us. That may be true, but an even worse fate is in store: our great-grandchildren will not care - they will have no way to comprehend what was lost. They will be indifferent. (Hales 1989, p 144)
There are concerns, however, regarding both the possibility and the probability of maintaining and achieving these functions. Hales (1989) and Woodley (1995) note that due to the degree of isolation parks have experienced, they can only be maintained through intervention aimed toward replicating 'natural' processes, but are no longer natural themselves. Another argument supportive of this notion comes from McKibben (1989), who suggests that natural processes no longer exist - anywhere. This may be a valid point, yet it does not alter the potential role of parks and protected areas regarding re-'natural'ization or regarding the maintenance of essential ecological processes. In both cases, I emphasize that parks represent relatively undisturbed natural areas, and that 'natural' itself, as noted in the introduction, is a relative concept. The first argument, however, points to the negative consequences of isolation that will be discussed in the next chapter: trans-boundary problems, reduction in biodiversity, and concerns about ecological integrity. Autopoietic approaches to park planning and management which have allowed and encouraged such isolation are inadequate. This is indicated by the social influences on Point Pelee National Park described in Section 3.3. The concerns raised by these issues have instituted a recent shift in park planning toward establishing ecological integrity as a guiding principle (Parks Canada 1994).
In most cases, however - Point Pelee National Park as a prime example - parks cover too small a portion of the landscape, to make maintaining ecological integrity a simple task for planning and management. The two poietic system types suggest two possible approaches for coping with the difficulties. The argument noted by Hales and Woodley is an autopoietic approach: control the park ecosystems by taking over the role of nature in maintaining ecological processes.
The areas we have to work with, even ones as large as Yellowstone, are manifestly artificial, resulting from human actions... since we cannot rely on 'nature' to maintain systems... human manipulation must become far more active and interventionist. We may well have reached the point where the preservation of natural systems in parks will be dependent on the human ability to synthesize its process. (Hales 1989, p 143)
The second approach, a sympoietic one, involves widening the zone of concern with respect to park planning and management to include other areas and influences essential to maintaining ecological integrity within parks. Such an approach is currently being articulated in Parks Canada Policy (Parks Canada 1994) and through development of Ecosystem Conservation Plans (e.g. Nelson and Skibicki 1997). One may question, however, whether suggested policy changes are happening on the ground. Conventional planning and management approaches have some degree of inertia that makes these changes difficult (B. Stephenson 1997, pers. com.). As noted, poietic systems can become entrenched into particular trajectories due to both their degree of organizational closure and the degree and nature of their structural coupling. I will return to discuss these concerns and to assess the two different approaches in the following chapter. Here I will take a more general perspective and consider planning for national parks as an element of planning for sustainability. To do so, it is essential to situate such planning within the context of the wider social system. In particular, it is essential to recognize changes in economic conditions and in public sentiment from when the national parks system began. In addition, it is essential to understand the self-organizing influences generating the relevant institutional structures, including both formal park planning and other bureaucracies, as well as informal cultural norms. To consider these issues in depth is not the purpose of this thesis, although I believe it would be an interesting exploration. However, I believe they are important and critical to understanding the broad picture and will, therefore, consider them briefly.
Changes in Canadian society since designation of the first national park at Banff in 1885 have been substantial and dramatic, including both economic and cultural aspects. These, and other factors, have generated significant changes in both the landscape and in the social structure. Economically the key shift has been from a high level of dependence on primary sector activity - exploitation of natural resources - to secondary and tertiary sector activities - manufacturing and service industries. Paralleling this shift has been a change in perception of the natural environment from an endless wilderness to a scarce, and possibly precious, resource - although the level of agreement regarding the last point varies. These shifts have been influential with respect to planning for national parks. Consider the original designations:
Order in Council No. 2197, November 1885:
...there have been discovered several hot mineral springs which promise to be of great sanitary advantage to the public, and in order that proper control of the lands surrounding these springs may be vested in the Crown, the said lands [...] are hereby reserved from sale or settlement or squatting. (in Lothian 1987, 17)
Rocky Mountains Park Act, June 1887:
The said tract of land is hereby reserved and set apart as a public park and pleasure ground for the benefit, advantage and enjoyment of the people of Canada... and shall be known as the Rocky Mountains Park of Canada. (in Lothian 1987, 23)
Although the wording of these documents have familiar tones, they must be recognized within the socio-economic context of the time which was characterized by a focus on development and exploitation of natural resources - including national parks. In describing the early history of the national parks, both Lothian (1987) and McNamee (1993) note this emphasis.
The national policy... in the 1880s stressed the need to develop and exploit natural resources as the means to developing a national economy. National parks that produced profits from tourism and resource development were simply viewed as an extension of that policy. The underlying assumption of the national policy was that there were plenty of natural resources to exploit... The first parks were manifestations of that policy. (McNamee 1993, p 21)
This does not necessarily mean that conservation was ignored, but rather that it was not seen as a contradiction to development (McNamee 1993). In order for parks to meet their mandate they had to be developed.*2
Figure 4.7 illustrates some of the self-organizing factors generating national park planning systems. As with other diagrams, its intent is to be illustrative. It does, however, include key changes over the years, compiled from trends mentioned by Lothian (1987), Dearden and Rollins (1993), Eagles (1993), and McNamee (1993). From the early focus on development noted above, the first National Parks Act in 1930 brought future generations into consideration (Lothian 1987).
The diagram also includes the social influences just noted. These social influences are global-directional influences that play a role in generating the planning system, but they are also elements of the social system that the planning system is a component of and to which it is structurally coupled. The curved end of the arrow - which represents recent planning and policy emerging from the global-local interactions - is to indicate that some of these factors play a retarding role. They prevent movement toward a more ecologically based planning system. Historical interactions - both internal to the park planning system, internal to the wider social system, and occurring with respect to the coupling between them - provide constraints on future trajectories.
At the bottom of this illustration, I draw attention to a critical question: What are the future trends with respect to the park emphasis and the social influences? From this arises further questions: What are the consequent implications for park planning? What new attractor is being generated? The first question must be asked regarding the direction of shift, as illustrated, but also with respect to the relative weighting of the various influences, a factor not indicated by the diagram. For example, threats - especially to the ecological integrity of the park - from external influences are continually increasing, creating a shift from internal to external, as indicated on Figure 4.7. However, threats are also increasing internally such as the ecological stresses that result from increased use of parks due to increased desire for recreational opportunities among the public. Both the shift and the general increase in this self-organizing influence will have an impact on the landscape as noted regarding Point Pelee in Chapter 3. The concern here, however, is to emphasize that they have an influence on the planning system that emerges. What either impact may be is unclear. Such changes cannot be described or understood with any degree of precision or predictability.
With respect to the planning system that emerges, it is essential to recognize other complicating factors. These include complex human characteristics such as interpretation and learning ability, relevant to both those planning and the general public. They also include social factors such as social influences described in Chapter 3 and the dominant paradigms. Consideration of these issues will be discussed, to some extent, in the following chapter.
As well as changes to the direction and weighting of self-organizing influences, I believe it is also essential to consider the introduction of new influences. In making such a statement, however, I re-emphasize that these are subjective interpretations - what I describe as a new influence others might interpret as an alteration in direction or weighting. Either way, it is the factor of change that is critical - and the consequent effects of such change on the planning system. In addition, it is essential to consider the relevance such changes may have with respect to the nature and strength of structural coupling between the planning systems and the wider social system. One particular change currently happening - the introduction of a new influence - seems to me to hold particular significance in both respects.
My sense is that, on a general social level, we are shifting away from an emphasis on ethically based decision making, to economically based decision making. An emphasis on economic concerns - or more particularly, financial concerns - is dominant within our society. We increasingly emphasize the importance of financial costs and benefits with respect to actions taken or considered, rather than emphasize the consequences these actions may have on others - including the consequences on future generations.
In planning for sustainability, these ethical issues are crucial. Considering the potentially significant role of parks and protected areas in maintaining ecological processes, it is a concern when these ethical considerations are given less weight. There is a current move within the national parks systems toward 'business plans' - stressing economic over ethical concerns.
It is often forgotten that one of the most important skills required of a manager is in negotiating for operating and capital resources in an environment of rapidly escalating priorities across government.
The result is that across the country, leading protected heritage area managers are rethinking how they operate the business side of their mandate. While we must ensure that the intrinsic values of protected areas are fully understood by people who allocate resources, we must at the same time justify to them that we will return the maximum economic benefit consistent with maintaining ecological and commemorative integrity. We are led, therefore, to devoting time and talent to things like: revenue generation; service minimums; and levels of risk for visitors and national park and historic site environments.
I can only assure you ... that our financial plans are solely directed towards achieving and maintaining ecological and commemorative integrity ... business is not our business but the means to our ends. (Roszell 1996, p 33-4)
Despite her reassurance, I interpret Roszell's statements as reflective of a new self-organizing influence on the emerging park planning system - one that may have considerable impact. To recognize the full significance, it is essential to recognize that park planning is a political process (Eidsvik 1964, McNamee 1993). A notion that emphasizes the strength of the structural coupling between the planning system and its social context. My concern is that the park planning system is not only shifting away from ethically based decision-making, but that structural coupling to economic aspects of the social system is being strengthened. The potential for positive feedback to reinforce such changes generates a concern for the type of planning and management that will occur in the future. This concern is reflected by extending an often quoted comment from Aldo Leopold:
The 'key-log' which must be removed to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (Leopold 1966, p 262 orig. 1949)
In light of these concerns, I believe the difference between autopoietic and sympoietic planning approaches noted above carries a crucial, though perhaps subtle, significance. Taking an autopoietic approach reinforces the "enclave mentality" regarding conservation issues (Sax 1994). Conservation concerns are restricted to a small portion of the social system - at least on a bureaucratic level. This can lead to the perception that such issues need only be the responsibility of a small portion of the social system - and not that of any other part of the social system. Advocating a sympoietic approach has the advantage of spreading sustainability concerns across a wider scope, incorporating a greater portion of the social system. The importance of such latter emphases are stressed by Nelson (1993a), Sax (1994), Miller et al. (1996), and many others. The concern that future generations will be unable to even know or understand what is missing is a relevant example of the possible outcomes.
Park values cannot survive in a hostile environment, nor can our support for parks save our societies from otherwise irresponsible behavior. At best, parks are holding actions. (Hales 1989, p 143)
The pervasive, powerful, and potentially dramatic impact of global-directional influences reflected in the underlying social ethics and cultural norms must not be underestimated. These self-organizing factors are causal influences. They will effect the type of system - both planning system and social system - that will emerge.
*2 These two arguments hold some striking and interesting parallels to the current debates regarding sustainable development.