Toward a Post-Normal Science: New (?) Approaches to Research
Most recent substantive changes:
May 1998
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Toward a Post-Normal Science: New (?) Approaches to Research |
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Ontological-Epistemological Issues
Methodological Issues
Methods
Interpretation
Validation
This site is a continual 'work-in-progress.' No attempt is made to provide definitive answers to any of these questions - since none are possible. The intent is to identify and discuss relevant issues, considerations, and possibilities; to pose questions, not answer them.
Not all of the above questions have responses here. Those that do are covered with varying degrees of depth. There is room for expansion in many directions. Comments, linkages to relevant websites, and/or suggestions of other authors who should be included in the bibliography or discussion are welcome and appreciated.
There is a story of three blind men and an elephant. Each man is feeling a different body part - tail, trunk, leg - so they quite obviously have different understandings of the elephant. The three could believe they are investigating different objects, or they could argue over what an elephant 'really' is. Considered as a literal problem in the physical space, the difficulty can be resolved: call a sighted person and find out the truth. When the elephant is considered as a metaphor for more complex systems, however, such resolution is never guaranteed and seldom possible. As a metaphor the story has an important message: uncertainty is a constant companion, interpretation is critical, and plurality is a given. Regarding the topic of discussion here - research - the elephant can be used as a metaphor for any research situation. The message, then, poses fundamental questions relevant for all researchers. How can we approach the problems of uncertainty, interpretation, and pluralism? In particular: What research approaches are appropriate for coping with the challenge involved in understanding the metaphoric elephant?
These are critical questions, especially for researchers grappling with large, ungainly masses carrying just a faint whiff of 'elephant' about them. Those of us embroiled in such cases have likely considered such questions and continually search for appropriate resolutions. Those of us using 'straightforward' applications of conventional methods regarding seemingly well-defined 'elephants' should not be too complacent, however. The questions are still relevant. For example, we may just be emphatically stating that we are - obviously! - feeling a tree trunk. Or we may be relying on the sighted for description - and vision is not likely any more valid than touch for identifying the metaphoric elephant.
Approaches for coping with these difficulties can, and are, using a variety of different avenues and approaches. Positivist scientists advocate that further research must be done to determine the 'true' elephant (even the metaphoric one). Extreme post-modernists would have it that the elephant (at least the metaphoric one) is only an interpretation. Many in-between positions are possible and most of us likely fit in this range. The discussion here is targeted toward exploration and critique of one particular middle position - post-normal science. Originally articulated by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, also 1993, 1994), the authors describe it as necessary in high risk situations where decision stakes and uncertainty are high, and systems are complex and intractable. In essence, post-normal scientists assume the reality of the elephant, yet recognize the uncertainty involved in interpreting its appearance, advocating plurality as a response to aid understanding. This leads to the critical questions noted above. It also leads to difficult issues with respect to methodologies and methods.
The purpose of this discussion is to consider methodological issues, including the process of validation within the framework of post-normal science. The ultimate question to be considered here is: What research methods are appropriate for post-normal science?
There are two key objectives. First is to discuss basic principles drawn from literature on research, methodology and science. Second is to supply an annotated bibliography suggesting methodological considerations and methods. To consider such responses and suggestions, however, there are more fundamental issues that get in the way. What is research? What is science? What can we know, and how can we know it? What is reality? Is it possible to be objective? Is truth a valid concept? Is it useful? What is, can, or should be, the relationship between theory and methods? How can we link them? The discussion must, therefore, consider these other questions as well.
In my research I am motivated by a concern for conservation and sustainability issues. My belief is that the conventional positivist reductionist approach and resultant attitudes have been key factors contributing to our current global condition. My interest in post-normal science arises in reaction to this belief. Search for new or different methods is an attempt to learn about alternate approaches for coping with the intractable issues we face.
My culture of origin is a western industrialized scientific culture, arising from a Christian, positivist, Eurocentric worldview. Although I feel I have moved somewhat beyond the constraints typically imposed by this perspective, I am certain it still biases my arguments and assumptions. Although I may appear to present a wide variety of considerations, I am still constrained by this cultural background.
Throughout the discussion, it is this western industrialized culture I refer to as "we" since it represents the primary audience I wish to address. For readers who find this 'we' to be a 'they,' my apologies for the bias, I hope it is not too intrusive a short-hand.
Since this culture represents both my background and my expected audience; my argument primarily focus on questioning approaches within this context. Moving beyond these boundaries provide many opportunities for questioning assumptions and beliefs, however, arguments can be stronger and more convincing when set within their own context. These ideas are revolutionary in a Kuhnian sense.
A final caution - this discussion represents my perspective of post-normal science and the various issues discussed. Although based on the literature and continuing discussion with other interested individuals, it reflects my personal biases. While the notion of post-normal science fits with my view, it is likely that I have interpreted it in a manner to accommodate such a match. I caution the reader to keep this in mind.
My position, however, makes an attempt at openness. I advocate recognizing continua, emphasizing contingent choice, and embracing pluralism. My position, generates, but also arises from the discussion articulated here. My intent is to illustrate that these issues need to be acknowledged.
Once we have learnt to stop pretending that we are objective observers and recognize that, in order to look at anything, we have to be standing somewhere to get a perspective, and that "somewhere" is already a position, then we can begin to appreciate the true value and significance of other viewpoints, perspectives and visions... (Palmer 1988, p 35)
Research is the process of producing knowledge of the world, including both its natural and social aspects (Morgan 1983, Neumann 1994. I use the term 'producing' in contrast to 'gathering' in order to emphasize that, as the interactive role of the observer gains recognition (e.g. Weinberg 1975, Harding 1987, Morin 1992, Rosen 1996), the belief that knowledge is a matter of gathering 'facts' is losing support (Morgan 1983). Knowledge is an evolutionary condition (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, 1993, Sanitt 1996).
In my view, research is a series of probes into what is presumed to be reality. Each probe is an attempt to understand a small slice. Figure 2 illustrates key elements and linkages. Starting points vary, and the process can be carried out through a variety of "strikingly different" methods suited to different situations and theoretical orientations (Harding 1987, p 2).
In any particular research situation choice of method will depend on a number of criteria, ranging from available funding to assumptions regarding the nature of reality. The two ends of this range arise on fundamentally different levels - pragmatic to philosophical. To ensure that the full range is explicitly considered when choices are made it is useful to consider philosophical aspects of research. I believe that, too often, the latter end is ignored. Note that I am not advocating ignoring the pragmatic end, but recognition of the philosophical end.
Figure 3 links the various stages, actors, and outcomes involved in the research process to various philosophical aspects of inquiry. I refer to this as a research holarchy, to emphasize the nested nature of the various levels and the consequent constraints. Choice of recording technique depends on the perceived linkage between theory and method (methodology), which depends on the perception of knowledge held (epistemology), which depends on belief regarding the substance of reality (ontology). In order to understand the various stages of the process, it is essential to consider these other aspects also.
There are several issues to consider here, then:
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, 1993, 1994) describe the notion of post-normal science as complementary to, but different from, conventional science. Given these statements, it seems sensible to begin a critique of post-normal science by questioning:
What is science?
The answers to these questions are, not surprisingly, quite diverse and involve considerable discussion among philosophers and scientists. Many different definitions are possible. Most authors agree on pursuits which are definitely science and others which are definitely not science. There are two common continua used to draw distinctions: science vs. religion, and science vs. arts. The latter - a disciplinary continuum - is illustrated in Figure 4. There is considerable discussion, however, over the question of how far to the right the designation as "science" is valid.
Along similar but different lines, Figure 5 contrasts positivist science, post-normal science, and post-modernism. This illustration includes more detail, referring back to the philosophical aspects of research noted earlier. However, although Funtowicz and Ravetz defend application of the term 'science,' they also note that some would contest this designation.
I use 'post-modern' as a catch all phrase indicating a variety of 'alternate' approaches. As I discuss the issues here, the distinction between both 'sciences' and post-modernism is greater and more significant than the difference between various post-modern approaches. In consequence, I apply very general descriptions and relations that may not be accurate on a more precise level. For example, not all positivists are necessarily realists (Smith 1983).
Aspects lower on the list in Figure 5 are in some sense derived from those that are higher and must therefore be compatible with the 'higher' levels. Belief in a single, objective truth, for example, rests on the ontological position that reality exists 'out there,' driven by natural laws that are independent of the researcher (Guba 1990, Creswell 1994). In contrast, the relativist position holds that socially constructed multiple realities exist, each resulting from the interaction between individuals and their worlds (Thompson 1989, Guba 1990, Creswell 1994). Such an understanding of reality is incompatible with belief in a single objective truth. As illustrated, however, compatibility at the lower levels is achieved across a wider range of possibilities. A fundamentalist realist, for example, recognizing that some information cannot adequately be captured in numbers may, consequently, use qualitative representations. Conversely, although a researcher who holds a pluralist perspective may be less likely to place faith in the possibility for quantitative data and analysis to adequately represent phenomena, the epistemological position does not preclude its use (Smith 1983, Thompson 1989).
Although neither of these contrasting continua provide a response to the questions regarding science, they do provide some starting points for discussion. Responses can be sought in different ways, each of which can lead to understanding the notion of post-normal science. I consider the following:
Led by the counter reference to normal science articulated by Funtowicz and Ravetz, it is worthwhile to consider the ideas of Kuhn (1970). His seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, provides a particular interpretation of the process, practice, and evolution of science. Although originally published more than 25 years ago (1962, with postscript in 1970), the book still provides an insightful and readable argument. Kuhn's valuable contribution is to apply both philosophical and historical analysis. He couples an evolutionary perspective with an argument against the common notion that science is a cumulative process. For example, referring to Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, he notes that:
If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today... [This] makes it difficult to see scientific development as a process of accretion. (Kuhn 1970, p 2-3)
Throughout the book he uses similar historical comparisons to elucidate the generative factors in science, factors hard to recognize in study of current practice because they are so neatly hidden by their familiar and fundamental nature. Hindsight provides an instructive lens.
[Those who are familiar with my work on poietic systems can follow the discussion presented below through a digression that places the arguments within the context of poietic systems instead. The digression provides a good example of the distinctions between autopoietic and synpoietic systems and the importance of the different characteristics. In return, it also provides a good description of the difference between normal and post-normal science. The digression leads back to the end of this section.]
Kuhn's basic thesis, garnered from a combined philosophical and historical analysis, is that science progresses through cycles: "normal science" followed by revolution followed again by normal science and then again revolution. His thesis generated debate in the philosophy of science community (see e.g., Lakatos and Musgrave 1970 ) and, for some scholars (e.g. Polkinghorne 1996), remains a contentious point.
Kuhn is perhaps best know for his use of the term paradigm - a term which typically refers to a world view or basic set of beliefs that guides action (e.g. Thompson 1989, Guba 1990, Creswell 1994). It is in this sense that I will use it through this discussion, acknowledging that it is open to a variety of interpretations (Masterman 1970, Guba 1990) and remains a somewhat problematic concept [digression1 - 2].
In discussing the evolution of science, Kuhn describes "pre-paradigm" periods prior to development of normal science. This stage is observable in the behaviour that is characteristic of immature sciences.
In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far more nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes familiar (Kuhn 1970, p 15).
As individuals chase after particular problems and issues, gradually developing methods, models, and tools for interpreting real world phenomena, specific communities develop. These communities eventually develop clearly defined paradigms. Kuhn notes Aristotle's Physica, Newton's Principia and Optiks, and Lyell's Geology as examples of works that defined the paradigms for particular sciences at particular times. Each work was "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity" and "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve" (ibid. p 10). The paradigm then provides a focal point for exploration. They help to define the limits of the questions asked, the models and exemplars used, the criteria determining who can 'belong' to the community, and the criteria determining what knowledge is accepted and validated.
'Normal science' means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice (Kuhn 1970, p 10).
Normal science - textbook science - is primarily a puzzle-solving activity. "Normal science, the activity in which most scientists inevitably spend almost all their time, is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community know what the world is like" (ibid. p 5). Research proceeds as scientists ask questions, make observations, interpret answers, and develop theories, all within the context of a particular paradigm and using particular examples and models. It reinforces belief in the paradigm "by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself" (ibid. p 24).
Eventually, however, anomalies arise; "normal problems" resist solution by known procedures, or equipment designed for a particular purpose produces unexpected outcomes. "When the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice - then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science" (ibid. p 6). Kuhn calls these "scientific revolutions." "They are the tradition-shattering complement to the tradition-bound activity of normal science" (ibid. p 6) and involve the generation of new paradigms through more open and wide-ranging techniques. During the revolutionary period constraints are released, leaving the scientific community open to altering the direction of questioning, to re-interpret the same information from a new perspective, and to allow new members into the community even if they hold different norms and exemplars.
Although normal science seems to be restricted - even dangerously so - it is critical to recognize its importance. This closure allows scientific communities to build up complex information that would be more difficult to achieve with the haphazard process involved in revolutionary periods. Kuhn's descriptions and examples emphasize the value of normal science.
When the individual scientist can take a paradigm for granted, he need no longer, in his major works, attempt to build his field anew, starting from first principles and justifying each concept introduced. That can be left to the writer of textbooks. Given a textbook, however, the creative scientist can begin his research where it leaves off and thus concentrate exclusively upon the subtlest and most esoteric aspects of the natural phenomena that concern his group. (Kuhn 1970, p 20)
[The] restrictions, born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be essential to the development of science. (Kuhn 1970, p 24, and also see p 17, 20, 34)
However, there are also concerns.
A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies. Such problems can be a distraction, a lesson brilliantly illustrated by several facets of seventeenth-century Baconianism and by some of the contemporary social sciences. One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving. (Kuhn 1970, p )
This single paragraph provides a clue as to why Funtowicz and Ravetz (e.g. 1992, 1993) chose the term post-normal science. They argue for development and application of a more open science in specific contexts such as in situations involving high risks and uncertainties. Of particular importance they advocate expanding the peer community by encouraging inclusion of different perspectives, types of knowledge, and validation processes.
As noted, post-normal science claims to be different from conventional science. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, 1993) use Figure 6 to illustrate their perception of the relationship. The two axes represent the two key factors noted in the introduction: recognition of the value laden character of science and of the uncertainties inherent in complex systems. While the authors agree that conventional, applied science is appropriate in situations with low levels of uncertainty and risk, they argue that it is not suitable when either decision stakes or system uncertainties are high. These situations require post-normal science which emphasizes recognition of the value laden context of science and of the uncertainties inherent in complex systems.
To quote Funtowicz and Ravetz:
The problem situations that involve post-normal science are ones where, typically, facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent. Because applied science and professional consultancy are inadequate, something extra must be added onto their practice which bridges the gap between scientific experts and a concerned public. This is post-normal science, comprising a dialogue among all the stakeholders in a problem, regardless of their formal qualifications or affiliations. For the quality assessment of the scientific materials in such circumstances cannot be left to the experts themselves; in the face of such uncertainties, they too are amateurs. Hence there must be an extended peer community, and they will use extended facts, which include even anecdotal evidence and statistics gathered by a community. Thus the extension of the traditional elements of scientific practice, facts, and participants creates the element of a new sort of practice. This is the essential novelty in post-normal science. In this way we envisage a democratization of science, not in the sense of turning over the research labs to untrained persons, but rather bringing this relevant part of science into the public debate along with all the other issues affecting our society.
Some people are uncomfortable with the idea that his new sort of practice is science. But science has continuously evolved in the past, and it will evolve further in responding to the changing needs of humanity. We are showing that the traditional problem-solving strategies of science, the philosophical reflections on them, and the institutional, social, and educational contexts need to be enriched to solve the problems that our science-based industrial civilization has created. To experience discomfort at the discovery of the uncertainties inherent in science is a mark of nostalgia for a secure and simple world that will never return. (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, p 254-5)
Their comments lead back to the question of what science is, so I turn to consideration of philosophical aspects, which in turn, lead on to reconsideration of post-normal science, incorporating former considerations.
See a metaphorical illustration of paradigms and the distinction between revolutionary and post-normal science.
Ontology - Epistemology - Methodology
I separate these into three areas for ease of discussion. Ontological issues relate to the nature of existence, epistemological issues to the nature of knowledge, and methodological issues to the process of understanding. As will be made clear through this discussion, however, the three cannot be separated. This is especially true for ontological and epistemological issues. How can we establish what exists without first establishing what we can know and how we can know it? How can we establish what we can know and how we can know it without first establishing what can be? In addition, even discussion of these issues requires some degree of methodological consideration...
If you've never seen either a windmill or a giant, one is as easy to believe in as the other. - Cervantes
Ontological issues relate to the nature of existence: What exists? What is reality? For most of us, these issues represent basic, culturally conditioned fundamentals that we accept without question. The point of this section is primarily to pose some questions and identify some alternatives to make each of us aware that we operate by accepting specific ontologies - and that these are ultimately based on belief.
Such questions have puzzled philosophers for millennia. I will not presume to attempt any definitive answers, but rather to outline some of the possibilities. My motivation lies with the same concern noted by Palmer.
All that we do is influenced, shaped and given meaning by the core beliefs by which we operate, even if we are unaware of these beliefs. Nowhere is this issue of core beliefs more important than in relation to how we see the world, what we believe to be its purpose and where we understand ourselves to fit in all of this. From these beliefs spring our actions and our contemplation. From our understanding or our modeling of the world flow our words and deeds. (Palmer 1988, p 11)
"Words and deeds" include research - research that in turn shapes our understanding. There is a recursive process involved, the benefits and limitations of which are noted to some extent by Kuhn's discussion and his definition of paradigm. Although science is generally taken to be an objective process, it is based on core beliefs. Such beliefs, in turn, are reinforced by understanding gained through scientific study. As an obvious example, one does not pursue explanation for two billion year old fossils if one believes the world began four thousand years ago.
To consider ontological positions, then, we must begin with some key questions.
What is reality? What exists? Did anything exist before the beginning of the universe? Was there a beginning to the universe? What or who constituted or began it? Is there a universe? Is there only one universe? Is there only one reality? Is time linear? Fundamental? Contingent? Cyclic? Is reality based on the subatomic particles physicists have measured and 'proven' to exist? Or if not these particles, on some smaller set of particles, or at least on some sort of physical entities? Is reality based on an ultimate truth governed by divine being, with the physical world as little more than a testing ground for proving ones right to immortality? Is reality socially constructed - an agreement based on communicative interaction among individuals that is consequently dependent on such interactions and individuals? Are these possibilities mutually exclusive?
Are any of these questions answerable? Likely not, but they are fundamental. Although inextricably intertwined with questions regarding what we can know (epistemology), and what we do (or at least think we do) know (cultural conditioning), these questions rest on belief. There can be no logical reason [digression] for choosing one response over another.
If one studies philosophy, such questions are held at the surface; they are considered, discussed, debated. In science, especially natural science, these debates are often buried. As indicated by the research holarchy (Figure 3), membership in a particular scientific community is typically associated with ontological and epistemological positions. Debate tends to begin at the methodological level. To quote Palmer again:
Our perception of the natural world is shaped and focused through the lens of faith... We all perceive the world through the eyes of belief; some people recognize this and call themselves Christians or Buddhists or Marxists or materialists, while the rest go on as though they did not have beliefs or myths by which they live. (Palmer 1988, p 13, emphasis mine)
I believe many operating within the western industrialized scientific tradition fit in this latter category. For those who have not considered such questions previously, I challenge you to recognize your fundamental beliefs are exactly that: fundamental beliefs. In consequence, I challenge you question their influence on your pursuit and interpretation of research. For those who have considered these questions, I hopefully offer some food for thought.
Above all else, physical reality is likely the most consistent candidate for 'proof' of existence. Even religious doctrines placing the genesis of this physical reality on divine being, admit its existence. Coffee cups on tables, photos from space, the need for food, all support such a claim - or at least we are trained to think they do - an epistemological consideration. What is intriguing is the insubstantial nature of this physical reality that we 'prove' by knocking on tables: "See?... This exists." To believe the quantum physicists, this seemingly solid reality is little more than an insubstantial shimmer.
While atomists have been around since the Greeks. Only recently has the belief in some physical particle - admittedly small, but definitely concrete - as the basic building block of reality been questioned. Polkinghorne, discussing the influence of various scientific 'discoveries' on ontological positions, notes the difference between discovery of smaller and smaller particles and shifting away from this notion altogether:
More troubling, however, are those occasional revolutionary turning points in science that bring with them radical revision of our understanding of the physical world. When the nature of mass changes from being intrinsic and invariable (Newton) to being variable and motion dependent (Einstein), or the nature of causality changes from being deterministic (Newton again) to being probabilistic (Heisenberg), a much greater challenge is presented to claims of science's ability to give an account of an actual reality than is represented by the discovery that some previously supposed fundamental constituents are, in their turn, in fact composites. In the latter case, changing the scale of the scientific map has simply revealed the existence of more detailed structure; in the former case, the whole character of the terrain seems to have been altered - Newtonian terra firma has become a quantum quagmire... (Polkinghorne 1996, p 11)
While 'discovery' of ever smaller particles are heralded as significant, the other changes Polkinghorne mentions have ontological and epistemological implications, shaking the very foundations of science. The fundamental nature of the concerns arise, at least in part, because they force re-evaluation of some of the basic principles of science, ranging from ontological and epistemological positions to methods. In consequence, it raises to the surface the question: What is science: an epistemology, methodology, method, or based on content?
In reference back to the illustrations comparing positivist science, post-normal science, and post-modernism, the two radical revisions in understanding Polkinghorne notes have generated the shift from a realist to a critical realist position. Wilber (1984) provides some interesting discussions.
Scalar and Social Considerations
Despite the insubstantiality noted, however, we rely on this physical reality: vegetables, transit systems, computer chips. We claim, or at least infer, research based on its presence to be 'most scientific' and somehow 'better.' For example, we can 'prove' relations among physical properties, but not among psychological characteristics. There is a considerable portion of the 'real world,' however, that carries a lack of physical substance comparable to the latter category. The insubstantiality arises with respect to two considerations: scalar and social. Figure 7 illustrates both of these considerations, noting that each leads toward emphasis on the social construction of reality which is more commonly discussed with respect to social rather than scalar considerations. The latter are typically taken to be within the domain of 'conventional science.'
From a research perspective, those dealing at a human scale, with physical subjects, have relatively solid, incontestable objects as their phenomena of study. Arguments that reality is socially constructed are hard to accept. In no way can I imagine that trees or swinging pendula are social constructions. Yet there are other aspects of reality that are more difficult to establish as 'real.'
With respect to scalar considerations, difficulties arise through the need for instrumentation, as the phenomena or subjects of study increase or decrease in size. Consider, for example, galaxies and atoms, which require different types of instruments, and consequently interpretations, to establish their existence. This requirement introduces both epistemological and methodological issues.
With respect to social considerations, difficulties arise through the possibility for multiple interpretations and meanings. Consider ecosystems, social movements, or God, for example, which are each defined in a variety of different ways. The concepts are social constructions, but depending on a persons ontological position, each concept represents something presumed to be 'real.' Two interdependent difficulties arise with such considerations: the problem of definition, the problem of evidence. How can we define an ecosystem, a social movement, or God, either spatially, temporally, or conceptually? Then, given the definitions, how can we 'prove' they exist? These, again, raise epistemological considerations.
Although they introduce some key questions, these scalar and social considerations, however, are still cast within a western cultural tradition. As such, they reflect only a portion of the ontological-epistemological possibilities. A small eclectic sample of ideas are presented in a digression (not currently available).
In ancient as in modern times it is doubtful whether it should at all be possible to divorce epistemology from ontology, method from model, the way to know (hodos) from the world order (kosmos)" (Koch 1987, 42).
Epistemological issues are concerned with the question of what is knowable and how we can know it. Bunge (1983) conceives it as a blend of philosophy, psychology, and sociology, describing and analyzing the human cognitive process. The relevant issues are interconnected with the ontological question of what exists. As Koch notes, separating the two - or more appropriately the impossibility of separating the two - is an age old dilemma. It must be resolved by realizing that knowing what exists, involves a recursive process. Bird (1987) refers to it as a "process of negotiation" - a line of thinking which leads to the growing discussion on the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 1967, Evernden 1992) and the co-evolution of science and society (Shackley et al. 1996). I perceive this discussion as a blending of ontological and epistemological issues.
Key Questions
What can we know? Is there such a thing as truth? What is it? How can we justify something as true? What is knowing? What is the difference between knowing and believing? How do we determine or justify the difference? How can we know? Can we only know through our senses? Through our intellect? Both? How can we know that we know, or can we? Can we know anything? Are there different ways of knowing? What are the differences? Are there different ways for justifying knowledge? What are the differences?
As with the questions offered in the preceding section on ontological considerations, these are unanswerable, but fundamental questions. I begin by considering the question: what does it mean to know. Pojman (1993) notes three types of knowledge.
The latter type of knowledge is the primary concern of epistemology. Another way to consider the issue is by contrast: what is the difference between knowing and believing. An example used by Pojman is useful:
What is knowledge? As mentioned, propositional knowledge is knowledge of true propositions. To claim to know something is to claim to possess a truth... Of course we may be wrong about our knowledge claims...
Knowledge involves possessing the truth but includes more than having a true belief. Imagine that I am holding four cards so that I can see their faces but you can only see their backs. I ask you to guess what types of cards I am holding. You feel a hunch (have a weak belief) that I am holding up four aces and correctly announce, "You are holding four aces in your hands." Although we both possess the truth, I have something you don't - an adequate justification for my belief that there are four aces in my hand. So knowledge differs from mere true belief in that the knower has an adequate justification for claiming truth.
Now the question shifts to the nature of justification. What exactly does it mean to be justified in believing some propositions?... (Pojman 1993, p 2-3)
Remembering some of the key considerations of post-normal science, this latter issue is significant. In science, the standard means for justification is peer review: although we may not be able to see the cards clearly, if everybody gets a glimpse and everybody sees four aces, then we are justified in knowing this to be true. In normal science, peers are members of particular scientific communities. In post-normal science, the peer group must be extended to include a wider community. By incorporating Kuhn's description of normal science, and the influence of paradigms and exemplars, the card analogy can illustrate the difficulties of justification by a limited group of peers. In essence, the methods and exemplars applied within any particular paradigm act as blinders, ensuring that everybody is glancing at the cards from the same angle. While this may provide a correct answer, having people glance at the cards from different angles, may improve this potential. These problems are the same ones outlined at the beginning through description of the metaphorical elephant. They, in turn, present further problems - methodological ones - by questioning how to resolve differing answers.
Before turning to these questions, there are two particular philosophical debates discussed regarding epistemology are relevant. First, is the skeptics argument that we cannot know anything at all. Second is the empiricist-rationalist debate regarding how we acquire knowledge, through senses and experience or through intellect and thought. Note that the latter should not be interpreted as through reason, for reason is relevant to justification in general [digression].
In order to show some of the fundamental questions relevant to knowing, I will focus on the skeptic's argument, for it presents a somewhat radical view pushing the bounds of what can be known, hence pushing the justifications of science.
Descartes (1641 in Pojman 1993), for example, wrote a section titled: Meditation I: Of the Things Which May Be Brought Within the Sphere of the Doubtful. He argues that it is impossible to know that what we experience in our (presumed) waking lives is not actually a dream. Other arguments typically offered from the skeptics view, include a variety. It is impossible to know that the universe and everything in it (including our memories), was not created half-an-hour ago. It is impossible for each of us to know that the world around us is more than a figment of our imagination. How is it possible to argue against any of these positions? Pojman, however, provides a couple of papers aiming to defeat these views. Next to the questions, however, they seem hollow.
Moore (1959 in Pojman 1993) begins with a "list of truisms, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true." I will not include his whole list, but only a few of the key points which primarily focus on a belief that physical experiential knowledge is valid. His list includes:
There exists at present a living human body, which is my body. This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously ever since, though not without undergoing changes... Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth... Among the things which have, in this sense, formed part of its environment (i.e. have been either in contact with it, or at some distance form it, however great) there have, at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of other living human bodies, each of which has, like it, (a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist form some time after birth, (c) been, at every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth... But the earth has existed also for many years before my body was born; and for many of these years, also, large numbers of human bodies had, at every moment, been alive upon it... Moore (1959 in Pojman 1993)
I must admit, however, that after reading Descartes, such statements bring no sense of certainty - they do not appear to offer legitimate truisms. Can I know that I exist or is that just a belief? As Kant states:
"It still remains a scandal to philosophy... that the existence of things outside of us... must be accepted merely on faith, and that, if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof (Kant, preface to 2nd ed. Critique of Pure Reason, in Pojman 1993)
Agreeing with these arguments, then, makes be a skeptic. However, as such, I would have to admit to being very impressed by my imagination - such a convoluted, detailed, and real dream it is! That I could imagine the colours of the setting sun reflecting on snow and water, the intricacies of Beethoven's 7th, and the inanities of National Inquirer headlines read standing in grocery store lineups surprises me. As does the possibility that it is all a convoluted pretense to tease me or teach me as suggested by Adams' (1979) mice or God.
I leave skepticism to others, therefore, simply on the basis of disbelief. Arguments such as Descartes' seem to me to reflect justifications that I find hard to tolerate. The coherence of experiential descriptions, creations etc. lead me to claim a particular knowledge: reality exists, and I am a part of it. Such a statement, which incorporates ontological positions forma a basis for further positions.
Linking these issues back to the scalar and social considerations discussed in the ontological section, illustrates some epistemological concerns. Figure 8 suggests that there may be areas which are unknowable due to fundamental ignorance and other which may be unknowable due to complexities, either from the need for instrumentation or the need for interpretation. The issues lead into the next considerations: methodologies.
To study a methodology is not simply to examine the exercise of method, it is to study a way of knowing... To study a methodology is to explore a logic of justification or a meta-framework for understanding the exercise of method, that is, for examining the principles and procedures by which we formulate inquiry problems, develop answers to those problems, and evaluate the correctness and profundity of those answers. (Schwandt 1990, p 262)
Schwandt's comment re-emphasizes recognition that the various aspects - epistemological, ontological and methodological - are interconnected. Methodology, 'lower down' in the research holarchy (Figure 3), relates to the link between the former two aspects and the methods that are chosen and applied.
Although commonly confused and applied interchangeably, methodology and method are different. Methodology refers to "a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed" (Harding 1987, p 3). This includes how particular theoretical structures or orientations are applied in research, and the linkage between these aspects and the choice and application of research methods (Harding 1987, Popkewitz 1990, Creswell 1994). In contrast, method refers to "the technique for (or way of proceeding in) gathering evidence" (Harding 1987, p 2). Methodologies are guided by ontological and epistemological positions (Smith 1983, Guba 1990) and will in turn, guide the choices of method and recording technique, and how results are interpreted and reported (Harding 1987, Popkewitz 1990, Creswell 1994).
Bunge (1983, p xiv) notes that "methodology - not to be mistaken for methodics, or a set of methods or techniques - is the discipline that studies the principles of successful inquiry, whether in ordinary life, science, technology, of the humanities." He then makes a critical point when he states that "methodology [as well as epistemology] is descriptive and analytical, but in addition it is prescriptive or normative: it attempts to find out not only how people actually get to know but also how they ought to proceed in order to attain their cognitive goals." For researchers, this does not mean we can ignore our ontological and epistemological positions, but rather emphasizes that they must be considered. It is upon the basis of these positions, that choices will be made.
Having discussed science and post-normal science, and having considered the various philosophical aspects of inquiry, it is now possible to return to one of the opening questions.
My response: Science is a methodology that tends to rely on a particular ontological-epistemological position (realism), tends to apply a particular type of method (experimental/empirical), and tends to be restricted to a particular domain (physical 'reality'). I refer to the latter three as 'tendencies,' because I believe they have evolved over the history of science, without changing 'science' itself. The 'package' or system of science as a whole has maintained some degree of integrity as a mode of inquiry, despite changes in some of its fundamental aspects. [For those who are familiar with my poietic systems perspective, I offer a digression to expand on this point.]
The subsequent question, also introduced at the beginning, is:
I believe post-normal science is also most appropriately considered as a methodology, although Funtowicz and Ravetz state that they pursue a new epistemology. I do not perceive the two notions to be contradictory. Re-considering Figure 5, which compared positivist science, post-normal science, and post-modernism, these notions can be understood. I interpret their work relative to the different aspects I have noted.
Funtowicz and Ravetz take the ontological position that Guba (1990) terms "critical realist" - a belief that reality exists external to individual perception and interaction, but that our understanding will always be partial and evolving. We must recognize an insurmountable ignorance.
By recognizing pluralist representations of knowledge, their epistemological position is closer to the post-modern perspective. Funtowicz and Ravetz claim to be "developing a new political epistemology for science" (1992, p 252), arguing for the "democratization of science" (1992, p 254). They make two main interconnected appeals: for improved quality assurance and for an extended peer community. I think it is worth noting here, that although this contradicts the traditional positivist approach to science, many scientists, even 'hard' scientists are backing away from a strict positivist interpretation. Such considerations were noted above. Others are also articulating alternative approaches in retaliation against positivist science (see e.g. Sardar and Ravetz 1997, Irwin et al. 1997).
Extension of the peer community, though based on an epistemological stance, must be dealt with on a methodological level. It is at this level that I believe post-normal science most clearly articulates a difference. Methodologies are effectively the means of linking epistemological stances with suitable methods - and the reverse. As they describe extension of the peer community, Funtowicz and Ravetz argue for the incorporation of different knowledge communities, in order to cope with the uncertainties and multiple values at stake in complex and high risk situations. Traditionally science has relied on a relatively constrained epistemological stance, even though it has changed over the years. The significance can be illustrated by considering Figure 5 in reverse, moving from the 'bottom' of the research holarchy up.
From the conventional view, results from any particular research project, would have a relatively narrow interpretation based upon a particular epistemological stance. From the post-normal science view, the same project would have multiple interpretations based upon plural epistemological positions. The differences are illustrated in Figure 9, showing a broader interpretation based on a particular experiment, when applying the post-normal science characteristic of incorporating a broader peer community.
By re-considering Funtowicz and Ravetz's three zone typology (Figure 6), a third, middling position could be included for professional consultancy. I have argued (Dempster 1996) that the complexities and interconnections involved in environmental issues push all such situations into the third zone, either because of the complexities and interdependencies in the systems involved and/or because of the diverse values involved. In consequence, all research in these areas, must address the problematic issues identified by incorporating characteristics of post-normal science. This means all such issues require the broader interpretation made possible through the development of extended peer communities.
Conclusion
Are there any conclusions to be drawn from such a broad, questioning discussion? I believe there are - conclusions that I noted at the beginning when stating that my position both generates, and arises from, this discussion. There are three key considerations.
Recognize continua: Rather than stand firmly, dogmatically, on one particular position, disregarding and even denigrating other views and presenting issues as either/or discussion, I believe it is essential to recognize the gray areas that exist among and between issues. Opposing positions are typically ends of continua.
Emphasize contingent choice: Recognition of continua on a variety of different levels, with respect to a variety of different considerations creates a criss-cross complexity of possibilities. I believe it is essential to consider the options and opportunities, but also the limitations and difficulties, presented by these possibilities. Each situation and its relevant context is unique. Tailoring research approaches to match characteristics of particular situations is not only valuable, but essential.
Embrace plurality: Given recognition of the two former points, I believe plural perspectives offer the potential for strong contributions to research. The complexities and uncertainties involved in many situations could benefit from the extended peer community, extended facts, and quality assurance that Funtowicz and Ravetz call for.
The challenge is to pursue research consistent with these considerations, and incorporating these characteristics. While much of science still uses conventional methodologies, there are others who focus research discussion in directions which have potential applicability for post-normal science since they incorporate some of these considerations and characteristics. Most notably, feminists (e.g. Fonow and Cook 1991, Harding 1987), critical theorists (e.g. Morrow 1994, Roe 1994), traditional knowledge advocates (e.g. Clarkson et al.1992, Inglis 1993), and social scientists in a variety of disciplines including education (Guba 1990, Firestone 1987) and organization theory (e.g. Morgan 1983).
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