...postmodernism robs fundamentalists of their ability to act...    K. Oxley 1998

A common critique of postmodernism is that the extreme position leaves no room for action. Unlike the "obvious" direction that emerges from a fundamentalist position, the postmodern position leads to an epistemological quandary: riddled with angst, one cannot move for fear of treading on another's equally legitimate toes.*

I find this critique problematic. It seems to me that the extreme postmodern position indicates exactly what must be done: engage others in dialogue in order to incorporate their concerns as a precursor to action, and then continually revise, reconsider, and renegotiate other positions, concerns, beliefs and understandings as action proceeds. Not simple, but certainly straightforward. There is a critical catch though. This statement has to be personalized: it is my statement about what I must do. The convenience of "we" disappears as the "otherness" of other and the contingency of truth is recognized.

Multiple interpretations do not obviate the need to act (Yannow 1996: 238).

There are assumptions underlying my (apparently) straightforward direction, however. I discuss these below, although I admit the brief speculations may raise more quandaries than they respond to...

First, I point to another critique commonly levelled against postmodernism. It seems that the extreme postmodern position is itself a fundamentalist one: claiming all perspectives as equally valid is perhaps an even more unequivocal and universal statement than to claim that only mine is.** The direction that seems "obvious" to me, emerges from a statement as foundational as others I might oppose... This leads me to question whether a claim of equal validity is, or can be, an "extreme" postmodernist claim - a discussion I consider elsewhere...

Second - and more importantly - this angst-ridden inactivity emerges without attention to the is-ought dichotomy: what-is does not necessarily indicate what-should-be and what-should-be does not necessarily follow from what-is. The two states are linked by the application of values. My action is based on my knowledge of what-is, but also on my ethical stance.

It seems to me that the postmodern predicament is a constructed position. The inability to act does not arise from the extreme position - that all perspectives, positions, and/or understandings are equally valid - but from a coupling of this position with an ethical stance advocating non-harm against others. If I did not give a damn about how my actions might impact others, the extreme postmodern position would leave me with little concern or lack of direction. I would simply proceed to do whatever I desired. Declaration of an inability to act emerges from an ethical stance that incorporates concern for the well being of others.

Thinking about it, I imagine that firmly holding such a stance could lead to the postmodern position anyway: if I am concerned about my potential to harm others, I would be wondering about their perspective, how they might define "harm", what their preferred actions might be...

Rather than critique postmodernists for their nihilistic, relativistic, deconstructive approach, then, perhaps I should thank them for enabling my awareness of how subtle an influence I might have on others. Previously I bumbled along assuming that what I thought was good was good. Now I realize that if I wish to act in a manner that minimizes harm against other I must question the depth of systemic and structural inequities that exist and engage others to question what they think is good...

Third, while some might still feel "stuck" by postmodern positions, I note that the "extreme" position often seems to be interpreted as no truth is valid, rather than as all truths are valid. Yet I think the latter is the more appropriate (although brief and limited) interpretation. Given this latter emphasis, then, while I recognize other truths as valid, I can also recognize that my truth is valid. Consequently, each of us can reasonably use our own truths as a basis for action. If this leads toward considering intervention, then perhaps intervention is appropriate. As noted, questioning intervention or otherwise is an ethical rather than epistemological issue. This, then, raises a different question: is the postmodern position an epistemological one - only? Or is it also an ethical one? My sense is that it tends to be both, but will discuss this elsewhere...

Does this, then, lead to similar nihilistic and chaotic quandaries that underlay the comments opening this discussion - but from a different direction? Does it lead to a chaos of action rather than to a chaos of inaction? Well, I suppose that if everybody made purely self-centred decisions, this might happen. [Adam Smith's followers notwithstanding...] While I do not believe the postmodern position advocates such decisions, it does not necessarily preclude them either - which leads back to the epistemological/ethical question...

 
 
 
 
*This reminds me of a joke about how to identify Canadians in a crowed room ® they are the ones who apologize when you step on their toes...
I wonder if only Canadians suffer from this inactivity complex?...